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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 17-2037   
______________ 
 
CHESAPEAKE APPALACHIA L.L.C., 
 
v. 
 
SCOUT PETROLEUM, LLC; SCOUT PETROLEUM II, LP, 
                                                     Appellants 
     ______________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 4-14-cv-00620) 
District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
______________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
December 11, 2017 
 
Before:  RESTREPO, GREENBERG, and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: March 13, 2018) 
 
______________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge 
 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an Opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
 
2 
 
 In this declaratory judgment action, defendants, Scout Petroleum, L.L.C. and 
Scout Petroleum II, L.P. (collectively “Scout”), appeal the District Court’s Order granting 
the motion of plaintiff, Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C. (“Chesapeake”), for summary 
judgment on Count II (“clause construction question”) of Chesapeake’s 2-count 
Complaint and denying Scout’s cross-motion to dismiss the Complaint.1  Since we agree 
with the District Court that the contracts at issue do not permit class arbitration, only 
what is called individual or bilateral arbitration, we affirm.  
I.2  
Chesapeake entered into various oil and gas leases with landowners in several 
northeastern Pennsylvania counties wherein Chesapeake is the “Lessee,” and the 
“Lessor” is (or originally was) the respective landowner.  Scout subsequently purchased 
the rights to several of these leases (“the Leases”), and has been receiving royalties from 
the sale of natural gas from Chesapeake pursuant to the Leases.  The Leases include the 
following arbitration provision: 
In the event of a disagreement between Lessor and Lessee 
concerning this Lease, performance thereunder, or damages 
caused by Lessee’s operations, the resolution of all such 
disputes shall be determined by arbitration in accordance with 
                                              
1
 On Jan. 5, 2016, this Court affirmed the District Court’s Order granting Chesapeake’s 
motion for summary judgment on Count I and denying Scout’s motion to dismiss.  See 
Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809 F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 2016).  We 
found that the availability of class arbitration constituted a “question of arbitrability” to 
be decided by the courts – and not the arbitrators in this case.  Id. at 748.     
 
2
 We write exclusively for the parties and therefore set forth only those facts that are 
necessary for our disposition. 
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the rules of the American Arbitration Association.  All fees 
and costs associated with the arbitration shall be borne 
equally by Lessor and Lessee. 
 
(JA 44.)3   
 On March 17, 2014, Scout filed an arbitration demand against Chesapeake on 
behalf of itself and similarly-situated lessors, alleging that Chesapeake paid insufficient 
royalties.  In its answer to the arbitration demand, Chesapeake objected to class 
arbitration on the grounds that it did not agree to resolve disputes arising out of the 
Leases by class arbitration.   
On April 1, 2014, Chesapeake filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a 
Judgment declaring that the Leases do not permit class arbitration.4  Following this 
Court’s affirmance of the District Court’s ruling on the question of arbitrability, see supra 
note 1, the District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Chesapeake on the 
clause construction question and denied Scout’s cross-motion to dismiss.  This appeal 
followed.  
II.5 
                                              
3
 The parties have stipulated that Pennsylvania law governs the Leases.   
 
4
 Although the arbitration panel decided that the Leases authorized it to make the decision 
about arbitrability, following briefing, the District Court vacated the arbitration panel’s 
clause construction decision.   
   
5 The District Court had diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.  We have 
appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1291.  
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The Supreme Court has made clear that “a party may not be compelled . . . to 
submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party 
agreed to do so.”  Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 
(2010).  Here, the parties do not dispute that the Leases do not expressly permit class 
arbitration.  The dispute instead is whether, despite this silence with regard to an express 
agreement to permit class arbitration, the Leases can still be read to “agree” to class 
arbitration.   
This Court has noted that “[s]ilence regarding class arbitration generally indicates 
a prohibition against class arbitration.”  Quilloin v. Tenet Health Sys. Phila., Inc., 673 
F.3d 221, 232 (3d Cir. 2012).  Several other Circuits, including the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 
and Eighth, have likewise stated that “silence” in an agreement regarding class arbitration 
generally indicates that it is not authorized by the agreement.  See, e.g., Reed Elsevier, 
Inc. ex rel. LexisNexis Div. v. Crockett, 734 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The principal 
reason to conclude that this arbitration clause does not authorize classwide arbitration is 
that the clause nowhere mentions it.”); Reed v. Fla. Metro. Univ., Inc., 681 F.3d 630, 
643-44 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding that silence in an agreement does not “constitute[] consent 
to class arbitration” (internal quotation marks omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by 
Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); Dominium Austin Partners, 
L.L.C. v. Emerson, 248 F.3d 720, 728-29 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district court 
did not err by compelling individual, rather than class, arbitration because the relevant 
agreements were silent as to class arbitration); Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 
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275 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating “the [Federal Arbitration Act] forbids federal judges from 
ordering class arbitration where the parties’ arbitration agreement is silent on the 
matter.”).   
Scout contends, however, that the absence of explicit language authorizing class 
arbitration in a contract is not fatal to class claims because such authorization can be 
implied.  In other words, Scout argues that if an arbitration clause reflects the parties’ 
intent to agree to class arbitration, then it should be permitted, even where class 
arbitration is not explicitly mentioned anywhere in the contract.   
Here, assuming that class arbitration may be permitted without express 
authorization in a contract, we find this arbitration clause does not imply the parties’ 
intent to authorize class arbitration.  The clause specifically authorizes arbitration “[i]n 
the event of a disagreement between Lessor and Lessee . . .,”6 (JA 44 (emph. added)), and 
Scout fails to point to anything in the contract that would suggest an implicit intent of the 
parties to permit class arbitration.7    
                                              
6
 Thus, when the clause subsequently (in the same sentence) refers to “the resolution of 
all such disputes,” it is clearly referring to the aforementioned “disagreement[s] between 
Lessor and Lessee.”   
 
7
 Scout’s brief relies heavily on Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860 
(Pa. Super. 1991), in support of the contention that the arbitration clause here implies an 
agreement to authorize class arbitration.  However, among other things, in addition to the 
fact that Dickler was decided by a Pennsylvania intermediate appellate court nearly 19 
years before Stolt-Nielsen, the arbitration clause in Dickler is distinguishable from the 
relevant clause in this case.  See id. at 861 (where clause refers to “[a]ny controversy . . . 
relating . . . to transactions . . .).  Similarly, Sutter v. Oxford Health Plans LLC, 675 F.3d 
215 (3d Cir. 2012), aff’d, 569 U.S. 564 (2013), which Scout also points to as support in 
6 
 
“[C]lass-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such a degree that it 
cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to submit their disputes 
to an arbitrator.”  Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 685.  As the Supreme Court pointed out, the 
“crucial differences” between bilateral and class arbitration “are too great for arbitrators 
to presume . . . that the parties’ mere silence on the issue of class-action arbitration 
constitutes consent to resolve their disputes in class proceedings.”  Id. at 687.  Here, 
because the arbitration clause neither explicitly nor implicitly authorizes class arbitration 
we affirm.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
its brief, is distinguishable from this case.  Among other things, the relevant clause in 
Sutter clearly reflected the parties’ agreement that “[n]o civil action concerning any 
dispute arising under this Agreement shall be instituted before any court, and all such 
disputes shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration . . . with one arbitrator.”  Id. at 
217.  
